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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Shareholder level taxes are taken into account in determining the perfor-
mance of growth and growth and income mutual funds over the 1963-
1992 period. We rank a sample of funds on a before- and after-tax basis
for investors in different income classes facing various investment hori-
zons. The differences between the relative rankings of funds on a before-
and after-tax basis are dramatic, especially for middle- and high-income
investors. For instance, one fund that ranks in the 19th percentile on a
pretax basis ranks in the 63rd percentile for an upper-income, taxable
investor. We also present an analysis of the extra taxes that shareholders
bear because of the failure of mutual funds to manage their realized
capital gains in such a way as to permit a substantial deferral of taxes.
This research was undertaken while Dickson was a doctoral candidate in the Department
of Economics at Stanford University. The research presented and opinions expressed are
solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board of Governors,
the Federal Reserve Banks, or other members of its staff. The authors would like to thank
Victor Fuchs, John Andrew McQuown, James Poterba, Charles Schwab, William Sharpe,
Mark Wolfson, and seminar participants at Stanford University, UCSD, and NBER for
helpful comments and discussions. Financial support was provided by Charles Schwab &
Company.152Dickson & Shoven
While it is not possible to determine precisely this magnitude, the extra
taxes almost certainly amounted to more than $1 billion in 1993.
1. INTRODUCTION
American households invest vast sums of money in U.S. equity markets
through mutual funds. According to the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds
Accounts, investors purchased an additional $67.1 billion in corporate
equity via mutual funds in 1992 alone. By the end of 1992, individual
assets in equity mutual funds totalled $466.4 billion versus $181.7 billion
just five years prior. The result has been a huge demand for information
about the performance of mutual funds in all types of media Magazines
such as Consumer Reports, Forbes, Fortune, Business Week, and Money Maga-
zine frequently feature mutual fund performance rankings. Newspapers
and public television cover these matters, and a small industry has devel-
oped providing newsletters and tabulated data regarding mutual funds.
Are the media and the funds themselves providing the most relevant
performance information for most investors? Our answer is "no." This
negative response results because tax considerations matter a great deal
for most mutual fund investors, while many published performance
measures and rankings ignore taxes.1 As Table 1 suggests, a significant
portion of the total assets of growth and growth and income funds are
subject to shareholder level taxation. As of December 31, 1992, at least
58.6 percent of the total assets of growth and growth and income funds
were subject to shareholder level taxes. In this paper we document that
taxes not only affect the level of returns of equity mutual funds for
taxable investors, but also that taxes dramatically affect the relative rank-
ings of the funds.
A mutual fund's returns can be described in at least three ways. First,
there is the return on the fund's underlying portfolio. Second, the gross-
of-tax return is the return on the fund's portfolio after fees, loads, and
bid/ask spread losses due to a fund's turnover are taken into account.
This gross-of-tax return (usually without load adjustments) is the return
reported by the funds themselves and used by academics and the popu-
lar press to determine mutual fund rankings. The third measure, and the
I Prior to 1993, only Fortune magazine regularly published after-tax returns. In general,
mutual fund returns are ranked over relatively short horizonsone, three, or five years. A
fund's sensitivity to the taxes of its shareholders, however, can not be easily determined
over such a short horizon, since variations in pretax returns among equity mutual funds
may mask the beneficial or detrimental tax management of a fund's advisor. This paper
considers much longer investment horizons (10 years at a minimum) when a fund's "tax
sensitivity" can be discerned with more confidence.Taxation and Mutual Funds153
TABLE 1.
Mutual Fund Asset Composition of Growth and Growth and Income
Funds, Year-end 1992 (millions of dollars)
Source: Investment Company Institute (1993).
Fiduciaries, Corporations, Retirement Plans, and Other Institutions are included in the category "Institu-
tional Assets," which is not available by investment objective. At the end of 1992, institutional assets
represented 31.73 percent of the total assets of equity, bond, and income funds. The estimate of
institutional assets, therefore, is taken to be 31.73 percent of the total net assets within each classifica-
tion. The estimates for retirement plans and other institutions (assumed to be tax exempt) represent
each component's share in the institutional assets category.
one we argue is the relevant statistic for investors subject to shareholder
level taxation, is the net-of-tax return. The net-of-tax return equals the
gross return minus the amount of taxes that the shareholder must pay
on dividend and realized capital gains distributions.
Many people need both pretax and posttax performance information.
Consider an equity investor who is accumulating money in a tax-
sheltered 401(k) pension plan and also investing after-tax income in an
equity mutual fund outside the pension system. It matters a great deal
which fund is used in each case, but the published information gives
little, if any, guidance as to which funds have been most appropriate
under each scenario. This paper provides a substantial amount of infor-
mation that should be valuable to investors with both taxable and tax
deferred mutual fund accounts.
Since the seminal work of Treynor (1965), Sharpe (1966), and Jensen
(1968, 1969,. 1972), there have been hundreds of academic papers on
mutual fund performance and evaluation. One class of these papers
(e.g., Kon and Jen, 1978, 1979; Lehmann and Modest, 1987; Grinblatt
and Titman, 1993) compares and contrasts the myriad ways to evaluate
performance relative to some benchmark. The other class of papers on
this topic (e.g., Chang and Lewellen, 1984; Henriksson, 1984; Ippolito,
1989) focuses more on the opportunity cost of mutual fund investing.
Topics in the second class include whether mutual funds are able to
"outperform" the market through timing and selection ability and
Growth and growth and income funds
Total net assets 301,496.3
IRA assets 61,729.0
Self-employed retirement plan assets 10,193.1
Other retirement plans (est.) 23,633.3
Other nontaxable institutions (est). 29,398.9
Taxable assets 176,542.0
(58.6%)154Dickson & Shoven
whether mutual funds offer superior returns to the market as a whole in
order to offset their expenses, fees, and load charges. In the context of
academic research, only Horowitz (1965), who focuses on the internal
rate of return of alternative mutual fund investments, and Jeffrey and
Arnott (1993), who focus on the relationship between turnover and net-
of-tax performance, adjust mutual fund returns for the effects of per-
sonal taxes.
Instead of focusing solely on the pretax performance of mutual funds
prevalent in both academic studies and the popular press, we will con-
sider three different performance measures. The pretax return is rele-
vant for those individual investors who enjoy tax-deferred status on
their asset accumulations (e.g., IRA accounts). For individuals subject to
shareholder level taxation, we compute posttax returns by adjusting the
pretax return for any required tax payments. Posttax returns are calcu-
lated for individuals in three different tax brackets. We also calculate
liquidation values for each of the three tax rates. The liquidation value is
the amount that an individual would receive by selling all of her mutual
fund shares and subtracting the required tax payments for previously
unrealized capital gains.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes
the data used in our analysis. Section 3 presents our basic methodology.
Section 4 demonstrates how startling mutual fund performance changes
can be when shareholder taxes are considered. Section 5 discusses risk-
adjusting the mutual fund returns. Section 6 looks at the aggregate tax
saving that might be possible if mutual funds distributed less realized
capital gains and allowed shareholders to defer taxes. Section 7 exam-
ines the contention that a fund's turnover rate is related to its posttax
performance, while Section 8 concludes and summarizes.
2. DATA
We compiled a data set of mutual funds using the following criteria. As
of October 31, 1992, the fund must have been classified as a Growth or
Growth and Income fund in the Morningstar Mutual Funds data base.
Since the tax effects we wish to consider should compound over a long
time horizon, we required the fund to have been in existence for at least
10 years. Each fund meeting these criteria was ranked on total net assets
with the largest 150 funds chosen.2 Our largest fund is Fidelity Magellan
2There is certainly a selection bias induced by choosing, ex post, the 150 largest funds.
Since our focus is how taxes change the relative rankings of mutual funds and not on
quantifying the return of a representative fund over a particular horizon, this bias should
not affect our basic conclusions.Taxation and Mutual Funds155
with $20.55 billion in total assets. The 150th fund, Eaton Vance Stock,
had total assets of $86.91 million as of October 31, 1992. As of December
31, 1992, these funds had combined total net assets of $209,104.1 million,
or 69.4 percent of the total reported inTable 1.
Investment Company Data Institute (ICDI) maintains a data base of
mutual fund disbursements dating back approximately 30 years. For
each fund in our sample, we obtained from ICDI month-end net asset
values (NAV), dividend and realized capital gains payments per share,
"ex" dates for the dividend and capital gains distributions, reinvestment
prices for the distributions, and split dates and ratios.4 NAVs are netof
expenses and fees but not adjusted for any load charges.The data cover
the entire history of the mutual fund or the 30-year span 1963-1992 for
those funds in existence for more than 30 years.5 Sixty-two of the 147
funds had data for the entire 30-year period, and 126 funds had been
operating for at least 20 years.
The data from ICDI combine short-term and long-term realized capital
gains distributions in the reported capital gains distribution amounts.
Under the United States Tax Code, however, short-term realized capital
gains are taxed as ordinary income and do not qualify for the preferential
tax treatment historically afforded long-term realized capital gains.The
ICDI data, then, overstate the posttax return of those funds that distrib-
ute short-term capital gains.
The capital gains distributions reported by ICDI are checked against
both Moody's Annual Dividend Record and Standard and Poor's Annual
Dividend Record. Both the Moody and Standard and Poor's publications
report the short-term and long-term realized capital gainsdistributions
by mutual funds. If either issue reports short-term capital gains, then the
capital gains distribution reported by ICDI is adjusted to reflect the re-
spective short-term and long-term realized capital gains components.6
Three funds had to be deleted from our original list. In November 1992, the Shearson
Appreciation Portfolio Fund was merged into the Shearson Appreciation Fund. Data acqui-
sition problems led to the deletion of the General Electric S&S Program Fund.Finally,
Lexington Corporate Leaders is set up as a unit investment trust whose distributions
include nontaxable return of capital. Since our data do not break down the taxable and
nontaxable portions of their payments to shareholders, we deleted Lexington Corporate
Leaders from our list of funds. Our total sample, therefore, consists of 147 growth and
growth and income funds.
We are indebted to Bill Crawford, Sr. of ICDI for making this data available to us.
ICDI data for four funds are available only quarterly from January 1963 through Septem-
ber 1967 and are not included in our analysis over that time period.
6Prior to the late 1970s, short-term capital gains breakouts in the Moody's and Standard
and Poor's publications are more limited, a fact that could result in some short-term gains
stifi being treated as long-term gains in the data.156Dickson & Shoven
3. RETURN CALCULATIONS
We define the monthly total return as the percentage change in value at
the end of the current month of one mutual fund share purchased at the
end of the previous month. Returns are calculated on both a pretax anda
posttax basis. Intuitively, the pretax measure reinvests the entire distri-
bution while the posttax measure reinvests only the after-tax payment.
In notational terms:








dt (1 - Tdt)DiV5nt (1 - rjKGains. posttax: shares = 1 +
PD,
+
Returns are adjusted for splits as necessary. NAVE is the fund's net asset
value at the end of month t. Divs and KGains are the dividend and realized
capital gains payments per share that are reinvested at prices PD and
PKG, respectively. There are nd dividend distributions andcapital gains
distributions in a given month. Dividends are taxed at the marginal rate
on ordinary income,Tdt,and realized capital gains are taxed atA provi-
sion of the tax code is that long-term realized capital gains distributed by
mutual funds are taxable as long-term gains, even though, at the time of
the distribution, an individual might not have held her mutual fund
shares for the time normally required for an investment to qualify for the
preferential long-term rate.
Since our data report "ex"-dates instead of actual payment dates, our
methodology assumes that a distribution's "ex"-date and payment date
fall within the same month. For the long horizonswe consider in this
paper such an assumption should not adversely affect accumulations. In
addition, the tax code currently states that any distribution announced
in October, November, or December is treated as income in that calen-
dar year even if the payment is not disbursed until January of the follow-
ing calendar year. The tax code, therefore, treats any payment witha
December "ex"-date, when many distributions are made,as payable in
December.
(1)Taxation and Mutual Funds157
There are two additional assumptions embedded in equation (1). First,
all distributions are taxed immediately. Second, for multiple distribu-
tions on different days within the month, we assume that the fund has
already gone "ex." In other words, the new shares received from re-
investing one payment have no claim on any further distributions made
within the same month.
Posttax returns are computed for investors in three different tax brack-
ets. Using the Internal Revenue Service's Statistics of Income, we calculate
the median adjusted gross income (AGI) for each year between 1963 and
1989. Median AGI is assumed to grow at the rate of the consumer price
index from 1990 to 1992. These calculations lead to a value of $21,314 for
median AGI in 1992. We define a "low-tax" individual as having taxable
income equal to the median AGI less the standard deduction for married
persons and three exemptions. We feel that such an individual probably
represents the low end of the mutual fund marketplace. A "middle-tax"
and "high-tax" individual are similarly defined using three times median
AGI and 10 times median AGI, respectively. Investors are assumed to
retain their tax status (low, middle, high) throughout the analysis.7
Table 2 presents the annual marginal tax rates for ordinary income and
long-term realized capital gains based on the taxable income of each of our
three individuals. These rates are compiled from Pechman (1987) and
various issues of IRS Publication No. 17. Throughout most of this period,
the first $200 of dividend income could be excluded from taxation for
married persons filing jointly. We assume that any dividends paid by the
mutual funds in our analysis are not subject to the dividend exclusion.
Prior to the 1986 tax reform, an individual was allowed to exclude 60
percent of his realized long-term capital gains (50 percent prior to No-
vember 1978) from the ordinary income tax, and the marginal tax rate on
gains was limited to a maximum of 25 percent for most investors. During
the 1970s, however, gains in excess of $50,000 were subject to an addi-
tional tax on the excluded portion of the gain, resulting in a higher
marginal rate that varied with the amount of the realized gain (see
Minarik, 1981). We assume that realized capital gains for each of our
individuals total less than $50,000 annually over this period. Beginning
in 1987, realized long-term capital gains are taxed at the maximum of the
ordinary income rate or 28 percent.8
We consider only federal tax rates. Returns can differ even more when state and local
taxes are taken into account.
8The reader should note that our posttax return calculations discount realized capital
gains distributions by the full marginal tax rate on long-term gains. This implicitly assumes
that the taxpayer either does not realize capital losses on other assets or uses losses to

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We generate mutual fund returns under three different scenarios. The
pretax return is relevant for investors whose assets are in tax deferred
accounts (e.g., IRAs and Keoghs). The posttax return is most relevant
for those taxable investors with long holding periods or who plan to pass
their assets through their estate.9 The liquidation value is the amount of
money an investor would receive if he were to liquidate his mutual fund
position at the end of the holding period. This value best describes the
opportunities for those investors divesting assets at the end of the pe-
riod for a specified purpose (e.g., tuition payments, down-payment for a
house, purchasing a yacht). The liquidation value for a $1 initial invest-
ment is calculated by the following formula:
T T
LT=fl(1 + R) - TCT ( [1(1 + R)- basisT);
t=i t=1
1/'dl cl




NAy0[(sharesk) (1 - Tdt)Divsf +(1 - rct)KGainsit)].
R and sharesk are the monthly posttax return and shares calculated from
equation (1), and NAy0 is the share price of the fund at the beginning of
the holding period. The number of shares are adjusted for splits as
necessary. equation (2) shows that the end-of-period liquidation value,
LT, is simply the accumulation of the posttax returns less the amount of
taxes that must be paid at the time of sale on previously unrealized
capital gains.10
Table 3 presents our results for the 30-year period 1963-1992. This
table shows the end-of-period value of a $1 investment made at the
beginning of the holding period. The top half of the table shows that the
median result for the 62 mutual funds with 30-year returns was that $1 in
1963 would have grown to a pretax $21.89 by the end of 1992. Over this
period, investing $1 in the S&P 500 index would have resulted in
Because of the step-up in basis at the time of death, any unrealized capital gains would
not be taxed if an heir were to immediately liquidate a decedent's holdings.
10 As shown in equation (2), the liquidation value would be greater than the posttax value
if the accumulated basis is greater than the posttax value of the mutual fund at the time of
liquidation. Implicitly this assumes full loss offsets.Taxation and Mutual Funds161
TABLE 3.
Mutual Fund Returns, 1963-1992 (nominal value of $1 investment)
Table 3 reports the value of a $1 initial investment at the end of the 30-year period concluding in 1992.
Thills is the terminal value of a T-Bill investment, while all of the other columns refer to results obtained
with the sample of 62 mutual funds with 30-year returns described in the text. Posttax values are
computed for hypothetical investors facing three different sets of tax rates (low, mid, high) and assume
that the investment is not sold at the end of 1992. The liquidation values assume that the mutual fund
investment is sold at the end of 1992 and any remaining capital gains (or losses) are taxed according to
the tax rates at the end of 1992.
$22.13. The numbers for the median posttax numbers are $16.51, $12.75
and $9.82 for the low, middle, and high income investors respectively.
The median liquidation values are $16.04, $12.04, and $8.93 for taxable
holders in our three different tax circumstances.11 The differences in
actual return over the 30-year period to a taxable investor are immedi-
ately evident. The high-tax investor who reinvests only after-tax distribu-
tions has an accumulated wealth per dollar invested on the order of 45
percent of the amount published by the funds in their prospectuses and
promotional material..
Table 3 also reports the value of a $1 investment in Treasury Bills (T-
Bifis) (the risk-free investment in our analysis) over the relevant period.12
Notice that over the 30-year period, even the worst performer in our
mutual fund sample did better than T-Bills. For tax-free investors, the
last place fund outdistanced T-Bills by 22 percent, the median fund
produced 217 percent more, and the best fund resulted in 11 times as
much wealth per dollar invested as T-Bills.13 The return multiples rela-
11Table 3 presents results for the median fund within each category. Because of differ-
ences in the pretax and posttax rankings, the median fund is not the same mutual fund
under each case.
12S&P 500 and T-Bill returns are taken from Ibbotson (1993).
13Because of the selection bias in our data set, it is quite likely that the worst growth or
growth and income mutual fund investment over this period involved an investment in a
fund that was not included in our data.
Method Regime
Number of funds = 62
(Pretax S&P 500 = 22.13)
TBills Mm Median Max Std Dev
Pretax N/A 6.91 8.45 21.89 76.03 12.99
Posttax Low tax 4.97 7.06 16.51 61.02 10.01
values Mid tax 3.69 5.97 12.75 50.14 8.05
High tax 2.53 4.63 9.82 40.26 6.41
Liquidation Low tax 4.97 6.59 16.04 55.56 9.24
values Mid tax 3.69 5.29 12.04 41.49 6.77
High tax 2.53 4.46 8.93 33.17 5.34162Dickson & Shoven
five to T-Bills are larger for taxable investors since T-Bils are more heav-
ily taxed than equity mutual funds, at least at the federal level. This is
because T-Bill interest is taxed at full ordinary rates (as are dividends),
while realized capital gains have usually been taxed at lower rates (See
Table 2). 14 Even if a high-tax-rate individual had the misfortune of invest-
ing in the worst of our funds, she would have 84 percent more money
accumulated (77 percent if she were to liquidate her position) between
1963 and 1992 than if she had invested and accumulated with 1-Bills.
The median and best performing funds generate 3.9 and 15.9 times more
wealth (3.5 and 13.1 times as much wealth upon liquidation) for the
high-tax investor than T-Bills.
Figure 1 illustrates the degree to which the pre- and posttax rankings of
our funds differ (for a high-tax investor) over the 30-year horizon.15 To
facilitate comparisons across different horizons where the number of
funds change, we report the rankings in terms of percentiles. The worst
fund has a percentile rank of zero, and the best fund ranks at the 100 (1 -
1/n) percentile, where n is the number of funds ranked.16 Figure 1 plots a
fund's after-tax percentile ranking versus its pretax percentile ranking. If
tax considerations did not change the relative performance of these mu-
tual funds, then the rankings would be unchanged, and all funds would
show up on the 45-degree line shown in Figure 1. One glance at the figure
indicates that shareholder level taxes cause considerable changes in the
relative ranking of funds. Obviously, funds appearing above the 45-
degree line have a higher after-tax ranking than before-tax ranking and
vice versa.
Table 4 presents summary statistics on the ranking differences shown
in Figure 1. The movement of an average fund in our sample is plus or
minus 9.8 percentile points. The maximum change in relative position
was Franklin Growth, which improved its rank by an enormous 43.6
points going from the 19.4 percentile on a pretax basis to the 63.0 percen-
14 The monthly post-tax return on T-Bils is R1 = (1 - Ta1) TBi1,, where TBiI1 is the nominal,
pretax T-Bffl return in month t.
15 A previous version of this paper entitled "Ranking Mutual Funds on an After-Tax Basis"
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4393), provides an appendix
detailing the individual performance of the funds pictured in Figure 1.
16 We also considered another performance measure based on a fund's return relative to
the median return. Fund X, for example, might have a pretax value 20 percent greater than
the median pretax value, while its posttax value might be 10 percent above the median
posttax value. We would then say Fund X lost 10 percentage points relative to the median.
This median performance measure, unlike the percentile rankings, might be able to distin-
guish large relative movements if funds' returns are tightly bunched. In the text we report
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Pre-Tax Return Percentile
FIGURE 1. Pretax versus high-tax percentile ranks-30-year period
(1963-1992).
tile for a high-tax investor.17 For a high-tax investor, Franklin Growth
returned an average of 8.27 percent each year over the 1963-1992 period.
In contrast, the fund that performed at the 19.4 percentile on a posttax
basis (National Stock) yielded its investors a 6.95-percent after-tax an-
nual return. Franklin Growth's percentile ranking movement, therefore,
represented an additional return of 132 basis points per year (after tax)
17Using the median measure discussed in footnote 14, Franklin Growth gained 37.8 per-
centage points relative to the median over the 1963-1992 period. Franklin Growth per-
formed 27.9% below the median on a pretax basis but 9.9 percent higher than the median
for a high-tax investor.
70 80 90 100164Dickson & Shoven
TABLE 4.
Percentile Differences of Rankings over a 30-Year Period (1963-1992)
Number of Funds = 62 (absolute deviations)
Max(-) reports the percentile point reduction for the fund with the largest relative ranking decrease.
Med is the median absolute value difference among the sample of funds. Max(+) gives the percentile
point increase for the fund with the largest relative ranking increase. Mean is the average absolute
percentile change within the sample.
over the 1963-1992 horizon. Overall, our interpretation of Figure 1 and
Table 4 is that the pretax rankings, which are the rankings usually pro-
vided to investors, are inappropriate for providing necessary perfor-
mance information to taxable investors.
As shown in Table 4, the difference between the pretax and the posttax
rankings of funds over the 30-year horizon is still considerable for
intermediate-tax-rate investors. The average absolute value percentile
change between pre- and posttax rankings is 6.2 points for our middle-
tax-rate investor, with the maximum change still being Franklin Growth,
which gained 25.8 percentiles. The additional return for our midtax inves-
tor in this case represented a 111-basis-point increase per year in after-tax
return over the amount the investor would have received if Franklin
Growth's pretax and midtax percentile ranking remained constant. As
one would expect, the difference between the pre- and posttax rankings is
not terribly great for our low-tax-rate investor where the average percen-
tile change (in absolute value) drops to 3.1 points.
The liquidation value rankings for the 1963-1992 period are much
closer to the posttax rankings than the pretax rankings as shown in
Figure 2 for high-tax investors.18 Figure 2 contains two panels. The left
panel plots a fund's liquidation value ranking versus pretax ranking,
whereas the right panel plots a fund's liquidation ranking versus posttax
ranking. The mean absolute value change between liquidation value and
18Previous versions of this paper contain similar graphs for midtax and low-tax individuals.
Comparison Tax regime Max(-) Med Max(+) Mean
Posttax Low 9.7 1.6 12.9 3.1
vs. Mid 19.4 4.8 25.8 6.2
pretax High 29.0 8.1 43.6 9.8
Liquidation Low 8.1 1.6 8.1 2.4
vs. Mid 12.9 4.8 14.5 4.9
pretax High 29.0 8.1 25.8 8.6
Liquidation Low 6.5 1.6 4.8 1.8
vs. Mid 16.1 1.6 9.7 3.1






































































































































































































































































































































































pretax return rankings reported in Table 4 is 8.6 points for the high-tax
investor, 4.9 points for the midtax people, and only 2.4 percentile points
for the low-tax investor. The average absolute value change in position
between the liquidation ranking and the posttax ranking was roughly
three percentiles for both the high- and middle-tax-rate investors but
only 1.8 points for the low-tax asset holder.
These results show that the differences between the various after-tax
rankings and the published pretax rankings are large over a 30-year
horizon, particularly for middle- and high-income investors. A natural
question that arises is whether it takes a 30-year period for these tax
differences to become important. To provide the answer, we separately
calculated mutual fund performance rankings for the three 10-year
subperiods within our 30-year data set.
Our conclusion is that the ranking differences are still considerable
for 10-year intervals. For example, the average absolute value change in
rank for high-tax investors between the posttax and pretax rankings
was roughly five percentile points for the first two 10-year periods and
8.7 points (7.1 and 3.7 points for midtax and low-tax investors, respec-
tively) for the most recent 1983-1992 period. The performance rank
changes over the most recent decade, in fact, are not that much smaller
than for the entire 30-year period. Once again we see that the effect of
shareholder taxation is quite important for the midtax investor but
much less significant for the low-tax household. Figure 3 plots the
posttax return rank for high-tax investors against the pretax return rank
for the 1983-1992 period.19 The largest increase in rank between the
two concepts was 35.4 percentile points (Fidelity Value), which moved
from the 17.0 percentile (pretax) to the 52.4 percentile (high-tax). Fidel-
ity Value earned 10.94 percent per year for a high-tax investor, whereas
if it would have remained in the 17th percentile, the fund would have
earned only 9.08 percent annually. The biggest downward movement
was Putnam Growth & Income (A), which fell a total of 37.4 percentile
points, a movement that represented a 247-basis-point decrease relative
to the after-tax return Putnam would have posted had it maintained its
pretax return percentile.
The case of Vanguard's Index 500 Fund illustrates how a tax conscious
fund could improve its relative performance. The Index 500 Fund fol-
lows the passive strategy of investing in the component stocks of the
Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) index in the same value-weighted
proportions as the index. This fund realizes capital gains for three main
A detailed list of the 147 mutual funds with computed pretax and posttax returns is
available from the authors.100
90
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FIGURE 3. Pretax versus high-tax percentile ranksb-year subperiod
(1983-1992).
reasons: constituent changes in the S&P 500, share repurchases of the
500 firms, and net redemptions by the fund's shareholders. The rela-
tively passive investment approach of the Index 500 Fund resulted in the
posttax return ranking 6.1 percentiles higher than the pretax return (85.0
percentile posttax versus 78.9 percentile pretax) for the high-tax investor
over the 1983-1992 period. As depicted in Figure 3, if the Vanguard 500
portfolio could have deferred all of its realized capital gains (without
sacrificing any pretax return), it would have ended up at the 91.8 percen-
tile for the high-tax investor. Dickson and Shoven (1994) show that
managing such a fund to defer all capital gains realizations is feasible.
While Dickson and Shoven (1994) are able to replicate the pretax return
80
70168Dickson & Shoven
of the Index 500 within a few basis points, the after-tax return to high-
income investors is increased by as much as 97 basis points per year
relative to the Index 500. This result is solely from the deferral of all
realized capital gains that Dickson and Shoven (1994) show could be
easily attained through the use of simple accounting and trading strate-
gies over the sample period.20
Mutual fund rankings change dramatically not only for taxable versus
nontaxable investors but also for high-tax versus low-tax investors. Table
5 clearly shows there is a considerable difference in the standings of the
various funds in our sample for the two different types of investors. The
average absolute movement between low-tax and high-tax percentile
ranking is 7.2 points (6.6 points upon liquidation) over the 1963-1992
period. The relative movements are still considerable over each of the
three 10-year subperiods. In the 1983-1992 period, for example, the
average movement is plus or minus 5.4 points (4.3 points upon liquida-
tion). This table suggests that it is not merely sufficient to choose one tax
rate to measure after-tax returns. Individual taxable investors, instead,
should be able to determine relative rankings based on their own mar-
ginal rates.
5. RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS
All of the above rankings consider only the average return over the 10-
and 30-year horizons and do not take risk into account. We recognize
that investors are risk averse and, in general, would be willing to trade
some expected return for increased safety. Since our focus is on the
relative rankings when shareholder taxation is taken into account, any
risk-adjusting measure we use must allow for straightforward compari-
son on both a pre- and posttax basis.
The usual starting point when one risk adjusts mutual fund returns is
the method first employed by Jensen (1968). Jensen uses the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) as a benchmark to determine whether or not a
mutual fund manager is able to engage in successful stock selection and
market timing activities. The assumptions underlying the CAPM ap-
proach are that the investor holds the market portfolio, is only interested
in the riskiness of the entire portfolio, and, therefore, needs to ascertain
the contribution of each asset to the riskiness of the total portfolio. One
problem with this approach is that many mutual fund investors are not
20As Dickson and Shoven (1994) show, a tax conscious fund that tracks the S&P 500 is not
an index fund in the usual sense, since it has to deviate slightly from the true portfolio









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nearly this diversified. For many mutual fund investors, their entire
equity portfolio is a particular diversified mutual fund, and the riskiness
of their portfolio is given by the variance (or standard deviation) of that
fund's returns.
A second problem for our analysis is that the usual CAPM model of
riskiness does not take shareholder level taxation into account. In order
to adjust posttax mutual fund returns for risk, we would need to make
some statement about the realized capital gains of the market portfolio.
This calls for some knowledge of the effective tax rate on accrued gains,
and we do not think it is straightforward to make such a calculation.
One possibility might be to use one of our funds, the Vanguard Index
500, as a measure of the before-tax and after-tax market returns. Since
the investment strategy of the Index 500 is to track the S&P 500 (the
benchmark portfolio in many empirical CAPM studies), its performance
is an obvious candidate for a market portfolio. Two potential difficulties,
however, come to mind. First, consider a fund that, at all times, holds
the same stocks and makes the same trades as the benchmark portfolio.
On a pretax basis, the familiar CAPM p will equal unity (and a will equal
zero), as expected. On an after-tax basis, though, the estimates of a and
/3 will differ from zero and one respectively if the sole difference between
this fund and the benchmark fund is the months in which distributions
are made.21
Another possible risk-adjusting method would be to use the consump-
tion CAPM (CCAPM). The argument for such an approach is that the
riskiness individuals are really concerned about should be the variability
of their total wealth including such assets as human capital, Social Secu-
rity wealth (and other government programs such as welfare and unem-
ployment insurance), and housing. The principal advantages of the
CCAPM are that, with this broad definition of wealth, almost everyone
is somewhat well diversified, and, consumption, by definition, is an
after-income tax concept. As with the market portfolio CAPM, however,
the CCAPM does not allow for easy comparisons since the after-tax
consumption portfolio would also have to be used as the pretax bench-
mark in order to consider changes in relative performance. In addition,
the CCAPM has not fared well in most empirical tests of the model's
implications.
Because of the difficulties noted above, the risk measure we decide to
employ is Sharpe's (1966) reward-to-variability measure (a.k.a. Sharpe
21This result rings true for any mutual fund relative to the benchmark. If the fund under
consideration makes taxable distributions in different months than the benchmark fund,
then the estimates of a and f3 will depend on the distribution months in addition to actual
differences in stock selection, market timing ability, or "risk" of the fund.Taxation and Mutual Funds171
ratio), which is simply the ratio of the average monthly excess return of
the mutual fund to the standard deviation of its monthly excess returns.
This measure is admittedly crude. Implicitly, it assumes that the mutual
fund is the whole portfolio of the investor or, at least, that its riskiness is
assessed separately from that of other assets. While this sounds ex-
treme, it may not be further from the truth than the assumptions of the
standard CAPM involving the level of diversification in the investor's
portfolio. The main advantage of the Sharpe ratio, however, is that it can
easily be calculated on a posttax basis as well as on a pretax basis,
allowing relative comparisons to be made.
The results of the Sharpe ratio are depicted in Figure 4. The top half of
the figure plots pretax average excess return against pretax standard
deviation, whereas the bottom half plots both concepts for an upper-
income, taxable investor. The importance of adjusting returns for risk
can be seen by the considerable horizontal spread in the funds in both
panels. (Their monthly standard deviations range from roughly 3.5 per-
cent to 7.5 percent.) We implicitly assume that investors have the oppor-
tunity to invest in T-BiIls (and also to borrow at that rate).
The optimal fund for all investors is the one with the largest ratio of
average excess return to standard deviation. If you consider running a
line from each point in Figure 4 to the origin, the highest ranked fund
will be the one whose corresponding line has the steepest slope. Every
high-tax investor, regardless of their degree of risk aversion, should
choose this fund (Mutual Shares) in preference to all others.The line
through the fund represents the opportunities that investors have by
choosing different combinations of this fund and T-BiIls.
Figure 4 shows that our earlier story that taxes dramatically affect
relative rankings is still true when the rankings are risk adjusted. The
largest improvement in ranking due to tax considerations is Franklin
Growth. The top half of the figure shows that roughly 80 percent of the
funds offered a better opportunity set (when combined with T-Bills) than
does Franklin Growth. However, the bottom half of the figure shows
that only about 35 percent of the funds offered a better after-tax opportu-
nity set than Franklin Growth. Tax considerations caused it to "pass"
more than half of the funds that ranked higher on a pretax basis.
The amount by which the risk-adjusted rankings vary from tax effects
are very similar to the nonrisk-adjusted returns. For the 30-year hori-
zon, the average absolute value change in the high-tax, risk-adjusted
rankings was 9.2 percentiles compared to 9.8 percentiles shown in Table
4 for the nonrisk-adjusted case. In the 10-year subperiod from 1983 to
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FIGURE 4. High-tax versus pretax risk adjusted returns-30-year
period (1963-1992).
1992, the average change was 7.7 percentiles for the reward-to-variability
ratios versus 8.7 percentiles for the average returns. The differences
between midtax and low-tax ranking movements are even smaller be-
tween the risk-adjusted and non-risk-adjusted cases.
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6. THE POSSIBLE AGGREGATE TAX SAVING
A natural question to ask is how much money could investors save in
taxes if mutual funds became more conscious of shareholder level taxes
and adopted strategies to defer the net realization of capital gains? Of
course, it must be recognized from the outset that the flip side of share-
holder tax saving is a loss of revenue to the Treasury Department. Esti-
mating the aggregate amount of the possible tax saving is difficult in the
extreme, and we can only hope to arrive at the approximate order of
magnitude.
The first step in making the calculation is to examine the amount of
capital gains distributed by mutual funds. Table 6 displays the dollar
amount of net realized capital gains distributions of equity, bond, and
income funds from 1970 to 1993. It should be emphasized that this is a
much broader universe of funds than the sample of large growth and
growth and income funds discussed in all of the other analyses of this
paper. Nonetheless, the vast bulk of the net realized capital gains in the
larger set of funds result from net realized appreciation on common
stock positions and could conceivably be eliminated or deferred if the
managers of the mutual funds were so inclined. The Potential Gross Tax
Saving column of Table 6 results from a multiplication of the Net Real-
ized Capital Gains figures by the estimated fraction of equity mutual
fund assets held by taxable shareholders (58.6 percent) as of the end of
1992 and then by the marginal personal income tax rates for realized
capital gains for our middle-income investors from Table 2. These num-
bers bound from above the amount of money that investors might save.
In fact, the saving would certainly be less for several reasons.
If mutual funds permit their shareholders to defer capital gains by
managing the portfolio in such a way that capital gains distributions are
not required, then shareholders will have larger realized capital gains
when they liquidate or exchange their mutual fund shares. By and large,
the shareholders would be postponing taxes, not eliminating them. Ta-
ble 7 provides some information about how long people remain in a
given mutual fund. A survey of those who fully or partially redeemed
their shares in 1991-1992 indicated the distribution of tenures with the
fund as shown in Table 7.The median person in the sample had been
It should be noted that there is a selection bias problem with this data source. The
sample is taken from those who sell their shares, whereas we would like to have informa-
tion about how much longer a person who currently owns a fund (and who is able to defer
capital gains because of the policies of the mutual fund manager) will continue to own it. It
must be acknowledged that the information in Table 7 is only suggestive, but it is not
exactly appropriate to the problem at hand.174Dickson & Shoven
TABLE 6.
Distributions to Mutual Fund Shareholders and Gross Potential Tax
Saving: Equity, Bond, and Income Funds (millions of dollars)
Source: First two columns, 1994 Mutual Fund Fact Book, p. 112; third column, authors' computations.
TABLE 7.
Tenure in Fund From Which Shares Were Redeemed, 1991-1992






1970 1,414.1 922.1 77.5
1971 1,330.7 775.5 63.6
1972 1,286.6 1,402.6 115.1
1973 1,300.2 943.3 77.4
1974 1,563.2 484.3 45.4
1975 1,449.1 219.2 20.6
1976 1,580.0 470.9 44.2
1977 1,789.7 634.8 67.0
1978 2,116.0 710.6 75.0
1979 2,451.4 929.0 80.6
1980 2,669.0 1,774.2 178.8
1981 3,143.0 2,697.2 268.5
1982 3,832.9 2,350.1 214.8
1983 4,981.0 4,391.6 360.3
1984 7,238.4 6,019.2 465.6
1985 12,864.2 4,984.6 385.6
1986 22,273.4 17,463.8 1,350.9
1987 31,823.7 22,975.6 3,769.8
1988 31,078.3 6,345.3 1,041.1
1989 34,096.1 14,802.8 2,428.8
1990 32,917.7 8,054.6 1,321.6
1991 35,322.2 14,116.1 2,316.2
1992 59,177.0 22,335.6 3,664.8






2 Years or less 24 23
3-4 Years 20 18
5-6 Years 23 17
7-9 Years 19 20
10+ Years 14 22Taxation and Mutual Funds175
with the fund for five years. Fifty-four percent of the sellers were fully
liquidating their positions, whereas 46 percent were only selling part of
their holdings. It is difficult to know whether people would be signifi-
cantly less inclined to sell their holdings or switch between funds if that
would trigger a large and taxable realization of previously accrued capital
gains. Certainly, given the current practice of most funds of realizing
gains quickly after they accrue, tax considerations have not been a major
consideration in determining the behavior summarized in Table 7. If the
turnover of mutual fund shares remained approximately what is shown in
Table 7, the Treasury would still collect, at least in present-value terms,
taxes on most of the capital gains realized within mutual funds. Five years
of deferral would save the investor in present value terms a maximum of
25 percent of the bill, meaning that the investors' gains and the Treasury's
loss would only be roughly one-fourth the potential gross magnitudes
shown in Table 6. There are even additional complications, of course.
If mutual funds allowed their investors the opportunity to defer capi-
tal gains by refraining from annual net realized capital gains distribu-
tions, the shareholders would then have some discretion about the tax
year in which to realize the gains. A household whose income fluctuated
sufficiently would have the opportunity to realize the gain when their
marginal tax rate was lower (15 percent rather than 28 percent, e.g.).
Some investors would be able to postpone the realization until retire-
ment, which often involves lower marginal tax rates. Finally, due to the
step up of cost bases at death, there is some probability that a deferral of
capital gains taxes will result in the effective elimination of the taxation
of the gains. It is considerations such as these that make impossible a
precise estimate of the magnitude of the tax advantage of mutual funds
permitting the deferral of capital gains.24
Our guess is that investors could gain between one-quarter and one-
half of the potential gross tax saving shown in Table 6. These savings
would be available annually and in 1993 would have been between $1.5
and $3 billion. This would be the impact of allowing mutual fund share-
holders to benefit from the same tax strategies that people who hold
stocks directly have employed for decades. No government regulations
need to be changed, simply the behavior of the money managers who
are, after all, paid handsomely for acting in the best interests of their
shareholders.
It is interesting to note that the level of awareness of shareholder level
24In the analysis of Section 4 we assumed that investors' incomes were relatively constant
(i.e., high-income investors always had high incomes, etc.). Widely fluctuating incomes
(and therefore widely fluctuating marginal income tax rates) would have complicated the
previous analysis of the changes in pre- and posttax percentile rankings as well.176Dickson & Shoven
taxes seems to be increasing in the mutual fund industry. Charles
Schwab introduced the Schwab 1000, the first fund that we are aware of
that explicitly managed realized capital gains in April 1991. The firm
now offers three index funds with this feature (the Schwab 1000, the
Schwab Small-Cap Index Fund, and the Schwab International Index
Fund). Recently, Vanguard has introduced its Tax-Managed Portfolios,
which include a growth and income fund, a capital appreciation fund,
and a "balanced" portfolio. It will be interesting to see the market recep-
tivity to these tax sensitive offerings.
7. AFTER-TAX RETURNS AND TURNOVER
We have shown that shareholder level taxation can dramatically change
the relative rankings of mutual funds. An important issue for taxable
investors deciding between the plethora of funds available is whether a
fund's future relative posttax performance movements might be inferred
from its investment policies. Our basic intuition is that the amount a
fund "turns over" its portfolio should be related to the amount of its
taxable distributions to shareholders. Many of our funds churn their
portfolios significantly over a single year (100 percent is not uncommon),
possibly realizing capital gains as they accrue and, thus, subjecting their
shareholders to tax liabilities. Those funds that do not turnover their
portfolios and more closely adhere to a buy-and-hold strategy, the argu-
ment continues, realize less of their accrued gains, allowing their inves-
tors to defer capital gains taxes into the future.
The relationship between turnover and mutual fund performance has
been discussed by a couple of authors. Ippolito (1989) presents evidence
of no relationship between turnover and pretax performance net of fees
and expenses. In other words, Ippolito finds that funds with high turn-
over rates earn sufficiently greater risk-adjusted returns to offset the costs
(other than taxes) associated with increased turnover. Jeffrey and Arnott
(1993) consider the relationship between turnover and after-tax returns.
Assuming a 35-percent marginal tax rate for realized capital gains over the
1982-1991 period, they report a statistically significant correlation coeffi-
cient of approximately 0.4 between a fund's average turnover and the
amount of taxes due from its capital gains distributions.
Jeffrey and Arnott (1993) conclude that taxable investors should con-
sider funds with relatively passive investment strategies (i.e., low turn-
over) to avoid large tax liabilities. A conclusion that high turnover funds
may be unwise for shareholders subject to taxation, however, does not
immediately follow. Consider a mutual fund with a high turnover rate
that is successful at stock selection and market timing activities. A higherTaxation and Mutual Funds177
pretax return (if one assumes a dividend yield commensurate with other
funds) implies there are more capital gains to realize. Hence, this fund will
most likely impose a larger capital gains tax burden on its shareholders
relative to other funds. However, if its pretax return is sufficiently large,
taxable investors may still want to invest in this fund even if the sharehold-
ers will have to pay large amounts of realized capital gains taxes.
To consider the effect of turnover on after-tax performance, we com-
puted average annual turnover rates for each of our funds over the 10-
year period 1983-1992 from Morningstar. Consistent with our intuition,
the fund with the lowest average turnover (Franklin Growth-3.2 per-
cent) jumped from the 40.8 pretax percentile to the 75.5 percentile for a
high-tax investor over the 1983-1992 period. The fund with the highest
average turnover (Fidelity Value-296 percent), however, also dramati-
cally improved its posttax performance, jumping 35.4 percentiles (the
largest increase over this period).
Table 8 reports sample correlation coefficients between average turn-
over rates and the ratio of posttax value (liquidation) to pretax value.25
The numbers in parentheses are P values under the null hypothesis of
zero correlation between after-tax performance and average turnover.
The P value represents the minimum level of statistical significance at
which we would reject the null hypothesis. We use ratios of posttax to
pretax measures instead of rank changes since the best performing funds
typically outdistance other funds by large amounts, and their rankings
may not change even if their posttax to pretax ratios are lower than those
of most other funds. If our intuition is correct, we would expect negative
correlations between turnover rates and the posttax to pretax perfor-
mance ratios. Table 8 shows that the intuition is basically correct. All of
the computed correlations are negative, and most correlations are signifi-
cant at the 5% level. Overall, for high-tax investors over this period, the
correlation between average turnover and the ratio of high-tax to pretax
value was 0.20 (P value = 0.015).26 These results suggest that turnover
can be an indicator of a fund's relative posttax performance.
Table 8 is certainly not a formal test of the relationship between turn-
Because of the problems associated with risk-adjusting after-tax returns discussed in the
previous section, we do not consider the relationship between turnover and risk-adjusted
performance. This analysis is consistent with Jeffrey and Arnott (1993).
26The corresponding table in previous versions of this paper showed that, in general,
turnover was not strongly correlated with posttax performance. Those earlier calculations
were undertaken before we had broken out the short-term versus long-term capital gains.
The fact that the turnover correlations are significant when short-term capital gains are
explicitly accounted for strengthens our argument that many managers sacrifice their share-
holders' after-tax returns not only by realizing capital gains but also by realizing relatively
more tax disadvantaged short-term capital gains instead of long-term capital gains.178Dickson & Shoven
TABLE 8.
Turnover Correlations over a 10-Year Subperiod (1983-1992) (p-values
in parentheses)
Average turnover is the annual average of turnover percentages reported by Morningstar. Turnover
data for 1992 were not yet available, and a nine-year average was computed for 27 of the funds in our
sample.
The numbers in the table refer to the correlation across the sample of funds between a fund's average
turnover and its ratio of posttax value (liquidation) to pretax value over the 10-year sample period. The
numbers in parentheses represent P values under the null hypothesis of zero correlation.
over and relative posttax performance. In fact, funds with higher turn-
over rates may still be good investments for the tax conscious investor.
This point is illustrated by the example of Vanguard's Index 500 Fund
discussed earlier. If this fund were able to defer all capital gains disburse-
ments to its shareholders, it would have performed even better on an
after-tax basis. Deferring capital gains relative to the S&P 500 index,
however, necessarily implies that the fund would turn over its portfolio
at a greater rate (7 percentage points per year in Dickson and Shoven,
1994).
8. CONCLUSION
Mutual funds seem to pay very little attention to shareholder level taxes.
Funds publish iong-term performance statistics that ignore taxes, and
the financial press ranks them on these pretax measures. Most funds
realize large fractions of their accrued capital gains each year. This type












Posttax value over PretaxLow-0.16 -0.33 -0.17
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on accrued capital gains and adversely affects after-tax returns to a
fund's shareholders.
We have calculated both pre- and posttax mutual fund returns for
individuals in different tax brackets over various investment horizons.
While it is not surprising that taxes lower the accumulations that one can
achieve with mutual fund investments over all holding periods, our
calculations show that the relative rankings of funds on a posttax basis
(and on our liquidation basis) differ quite dramatically from the pub-
lished pretax rankings. That is, taxable investors cannot easily and reli-
ably determine which of two funds would have offered them a better
after-tax return with the publicly available information. While we feel
that more work is necessary to account satisfactorily for risk, this consid-
eration does not dampen our main conclusion that after-tax performance
rankings are very different from pretax performance rankings.
Our analysis of the aggregate impact of the failure of mutual funds to
tax manage their portfolios indicates that the consequence is that the
present value of investors' tax bills is raised considerably. In 1993, when
mutual funds distributed $36 billion in net realized capital gains, taxpay-
ers probably paid more than $1 billion in extra (present value) taxes over
and above what would have been required with tax sensitive manage-
ment of the funds.
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